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New firms, micro, small and medium enterprises (‘MSMEs’) and 
entrepreneurship offer economic potential capable of being leveraged world 
wide for development and stability. Not least of this potential is the propensity 
for innovation and the facilitation of new employment opportunities. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) has 
suggested that to maximise the economic benefits of MSMEs and 
entrepreneurship, governments ought to introduce specifically targeted 
innovation strategies. 1  It recommends that these strategies ought to be 
conducive to entrepreneurship culture and aim to increase participation of new 
firms and MSMEs.2 The success of new firms tends to be premised upon 
innovation; such success benefits growth and productivity more generally 
throughout the economy.3 While few new firms experience rapid growth, the 
impact of those few can have a major positive impact.4 Even a small number of 
highly innovative, rapid-growth enterprises can lead to considerable economic 
benefit flowing from associated employment and productivity.5  
These OECD recommendations resonate in the Productivity Commission Report, 
Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure,6 and the recently announced National 
Innovation and Science Agenda which identifies innovation as ‘critical for 
Australia to deliver new sources of growth, maintain high wage jobs and seize 
the next wave of economic prosperity’.7 Innovation is identified as being vital to 
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all sectors of the economy and dependant upon the creation of a ‘culture that 
backs good ideas and learns from taking risks and making mistakes’.8  
Adoption of pro-innovation, pro-entrepreneurship approaches focus upon the 
economic benefits of entrepreneurship and the value of innovation in the long 
and short term. Long term economic development and wealth creation has been 
closely linked to innovation and the corporate form, particularly limited liability 
and the concept of a company as a separate legal entity.9  
Phoenix activity casts MSMEs and entrepreneurship in a different light, focusing 
not upon the economic benefits of entrepreneurship, but upon the immediate 
ramifications of business failure. Entrepreneurship is innately associated with 
risk and uncertainty.10 The risk of business failure is real. Legal analysis of 
business failure tends to focus upon financial failure attracting legal 
consequences. 11  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
reports on corporate insolvencies consistently reveal a pattern of corporate 
failure dominated by MSMEs.12  
Support for entrepreneurship is challenged by phoenix activity. Phoenix activity 
is not limited to a particular corporate demographic: it occurs in MSMEs, large 
companies, and in corporate groups.13 Corporate law offers new firms and 
MSMEs considerable freedom in corporate enterprise particularly when it comes 
to choice of corporate form, the nature of the enterprise and internal 
organisation. Phoenix activity challenges the extent of these freedoms since it 
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represents an abuse of limited liability. Where phoenix activity is characterised 
by repeated cyclical business failure, the long term economic benefits of 
supporting entrepreneurship and innovation tend to become a secondary 
consideration to the immediate plight of vulnerable unsecured creditor groups 
such as employees.14 MSMEs are not provided with a simplified insolvency 
regime, but are subject to the same regime as larger companies, though ASIC 
statistics suggest that these businesses tend to fail at a rate that outstrips larger 
organisations.15 Phoenix activity is frequently characterised by a cyclical pattern 
of failure and re-entry,16 at immense cost to the economy.17 Economists have 
long studied entrepreneurship, including the propensity of entrepreneurs to take 
risks undaunted. Indeed one of the most studied and puzzling aspects of 
entrepreneurship is the pattern of behaviour that sees failed entrepreneurs re-
enter a market to try and try again.18  
The adequacy and efficiency of existing legal and regulatory frameworks dealing 
with corporate phoenix activity have been repeatedly called into question over 
the past two decades through various reviews,19 inquiries, 20 specifically focussed 
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regulatory initiatives,21 and the implementation of piecemeal legislative reform.22 
In just the last 12 months we have seen the formation of a new ATO phoenix 
taskforce,23 an ASIC crackdown targeting gatekeepers enabling phoenix activity 
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Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Schedule 1, s 355-70(1). See Tax Administration Regulations 1976 
(Cth), Part 6A, reg 48.  
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including tax advisers, lawyers and other insolvency practitioners, 24  the 
Productivity Commission Report, Business Set Up, Transfer and Closure,25 and the 
Senate Economic References Committee Report: ‘I just want to be paid’: 
Insolvency in the Australian construction industry.26 Internationally a range of 
approaches has been adopted with mixed success. Despite these efforts, phoenix 
activity does not appear to have abated. This paper considers how neo-
Schumpeterian economic theory focussed upon entrepreneurship and 
innovation can, to some extent, explain why this is the case and also offer a 
sound basis for the evaluation and reconsideration of the existing law. 
2. What is phoenix activity? 
Phoenix activity is an international phenomenon occurring wherever limited 
liability corporate structures exist. 27  The behaviour underlying phoenix activity 
is largely associated with business failure, and may be triggered by an impending 
solvency crisis. While there is no single definition of phoenix activity, Australian 
scholars tend to describe phoenix activity as an abuse of the corporate form to 
avoid debts or legal obligations.28  Consider for example a company that 
transfers its business and assets to a new or related company that continues the 
business of the old company free of its debts. The new company, the phoenix, is 
shielded from the debts of the first company by its existence as a separate legal 
entity. The phoenix company operates the same enterprise as the first company, 
within the same market, at the considerable commercial advantage of being debt 
free. The first company is wound up or abandoned leaving unsatisfied creditors 
likely to include the ATO, trade creditors and employees. Limited liability and the 
status of both companies as separate legal entities generally preclude the 
creditors of the old company from seeking satisfaction from the phoenix, even 
where the controllers and shareholders of the two companies are the same. At its 
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worst, phoenix activity is organised, systematic, criminal and fraudulent; a 
cyclical, deliberate and illegal scheme to avoid creditors. The phoenix company 
may use a name deceptively similar to that of the old company; this may be an 
implicit part of the scheme to defraud the creditors of the old company.29  
Remedying the mischief of illegal phoenix activity is of practical importance. The 
benefits include continued economic confidence, law that inspires best practice 
among directors, law that is articulated in a manner such that penalties act as a 
sufficient deterrent, and a regulatory system able to swiftly and efficiently detect 
offenders and bring them to account. While there is no law that says phoenix 
activity is illegal, behaviour that amounts to phoenix activity can transgress a 
vast array of law: insolvency law, corporate law, 30 employment law, 31  tax law, 32 
criminal law, 33 and environmental law. The sheer extent of this law addressing 
illegal behaviour underlying illegal phoenix activity suggests that there are no 
gaps in the law such that where illegal phoenix activity occurs there is no law 
that captures the underlying illegality. 34 In these circumstances it is logical to 
conclude that a focus on enforcement would be effective in addressing phoenix 
activity.35 Yet the detection and enforcement burden incumbent upon regulators 
is significant and reform targeting reduction of this burden would be welcomed. 
The Productivity Commission has made three recommendations targeting this 
detection and enforcement burden: (1) ‘introduction of a director identification 
                                                        
29 Michael Quilter, Company Law Perspectives (Thomson Reuters, 2012), 107.  
 
30 Illegal phoenix activity invariably contravenes various provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) such as for example, asset-stripping (ss 588FB(1), ss 588FE, 588FC), insolvent trading (s 
588G), failure to make forthright disclosures (ss475 and 530A), falsification of books and records 
(ss 286, 1307), preventing recovery or reducing employee entitlements (ss 596AB, 596AC(2)), 
fraud (s 596), breach of officers’ duties (ss 180-184). Third parties involved in the breach may be 
in contravention of the Act: ss 79, 181(2), 182(2), 183(2), 588G(2). Fraud is a well-accepted basis 
for piercing the corporate veil. See Briggs v James Hardie (1989) 16 NSWLR 549, 567. ASIC has 
power to disqualify persons from managing companies (s206F) and power to wind up 
abandoned companies (s489EA). 
31 For example, failure to pay employee entitlements may contravene an award: Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth), s45. 
32 Illegal phoenix activity may be an offence under Part III of the Tax Administration Act 1953 
(Cth), and where it is a scheme to avoid taxation, may trigger the provisions of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act (Cth), Part IVA.  Non-compliance with director penalty notices may lead to 
personal liability for unmet corporate tax liability: Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), 
Division 269, Schedule 1. Security deposits for an existing or future tax-related liability may be 
required: Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Schedule 1, s255D. For a comprehensive analysis of 
security deposits, see M Broderick, ‘Legislative change to director penalty notices and security 
for tax payments’ (2011) 40 AT Review 60, 63. 
33 Relevant criminal law includes providing false or misleading information to a Commonwealth 
entity such as ASIC, the ATO or the FWO, forgery or the production of false or misleading 
documents in purported compliance with a Commonwealth law: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), 
s137, 144, 145.   
34 Matthew, above n14. 
35 Ibid, 117-118. 
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number, underpinned by an identification process along the lines required to 
establish a bank account, to enable the monitoring of director registration’, (2) 
collection of data associated with director appointments over time in order to 
ascertain patterns of involvement in repeated business failure, and regulatory 
collaboration and (3) cooperation via the Inter-Agency Phoenix Forum in order 
to alleviate the significant detection and enforcement burden.36 The question 
that remains is whether legal phoenix activity presents a problem that ought to 
be addressed by the law.  
3. Economic theory underlying tolerance of the failed entrepreneur 
Not all phoenix activity is illegal. Phoenix activity can be a genuine, honest and 
legal attempt to restructure following business failure.37 Tolerance of legal 
phoenix activity is a reflection of economic policy sympathetic to legal business 
failure, encouraging of innovation and supportive of entrepreneurship. Legal 
business failure and restructuring should not be demonised nor should the 
operators of the failed business suffer the same consequences as those engaged 
in illegal activity, unless there is a clear economic imperative for such an 
approach. 
The role of corporations within the economy cannot be understated: 
corporations dominate the supply of goods and services, access to information, 
employment, and media.38 Corporations play an increasing role in human rights 
and social welfare.39 As Bottomley explains, ‘the activities of corporations shape 
or influence national economies, they affect the quality of the environment, and 
they influence the actions of nation states’. In essence, an examination of phoenix 
activity is an examination of a particular aspect of corporate behaviour and its 
ramifications. Accordingly, if we are to limit or discourage particular aspects of 
corporate behaviour, then we must consider the underlying context in which 
such behaviour occurs.40 That underlying context includes the economic purpose 
served by corporations.  
It is logical for an evaluation of the law relating to a particular aspect of 
corporate behavior to use an economic lens to consider the interdependence that 
exists between corporations on the one hand and the economies in which they 
operate on the other. Reform should only be implemented after a consideration 
of the broader economic impact of legal or regulatory change. An economic lens 
adds a valuable and important dimension to this analysis since companies are 
                                                        
36 Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure, above n6, 28, 88. 
37 Anderson et al, Defining and Profiling Phoenix Activity, above n16. 
38 Stephen Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking Corporate Governance (Ashgate, 
2007), 1-3. 
39 Sarala Fitzgerald, ‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Australian 
Domestic Law’ [2005] Australian Journal of Human Rights 2.  
40 Bottomley, above n38. 
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economic entities that exist in an economic context.  
Schumpeter, Neo-Schumpeterian theorists and more liberal economic thinkers 
such as McCloskey, firmly position entrepreneurship and willingness to engage 
with risk and innovation as being at the heart of long-term wealth creation in 
capitalist economies.41 Schumpeter was one of the earliest economists to identify 
the critical importance of innovation and entrepreneurship to economic growth 
and productivity.  As Schumpeter explained, capitalism without 
entrepreneurship is like Hamlet without the Danish prince.42  
Schumpeterian theory is well suited to explain the cyclical behaviour of phoenix 
activity, and the innovation of business models that may give rise to such 
behaviour. Schumpeterian theory is premised on the behaviour of entrepreneurs 
within the market, and the impact of that behaviour upon the market itself.43 
Phoenix activity presents a challenge in that it can be cyclical and may involve 
rapidly changing business models, some of which are legal and some of which 
are not.44 These factors highlight the imperfect nature of competition and the 
challenges to achieving equilibrium. Schumpeter’s theory focuses upon business 
cycles. It recognises that markets are in a constant state of change and 
evolution.45 Schumpeter’s theory is best known for its consideration of the 
perennial gales of creative destruction, a process Schumpeter considered to be 
                                                        
41 JA Schumpeter, The nature of essence of economic theory, English translation by BA McDaniel 
(Transaction Publishers 2010 [1910], New Brunswick); JA Schumpeter, The theory of economic 
development, English translation by R Opie (Harvard University Press, 1934 [1918]); JA 
Schumpeter, ‘The crisis of the tax state’ English translation, in R Swedberg (ed) The economics 
and sociology of capitalism - Joseph A Schumpeter (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1991 
[1918]); JA Schumpeter, Business cycles (McGraw-Hill, 1939); JA Schumpeter, Capitalism, 
socialism and democracy (Allen and Unwin, 1949; Taylor & Francis, 2003); JA Schumpeter, ‘The 
communist manifesto in sociology and economics’ (1949) 57(3) J Polit Econ 199; JA Schumpeter, 
The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the 
Business Cycle, (Harvard University Press, 1934; Horst Hanusch and Andreas Pyka, ‘Principles of 
neo-Schumpeterian Economics’ (2007) 31 Cambridge Journal of Economics 275; Horst Hanusch 
and Andreas Pyka, Elgar Companion to Neo-Schumpeterian Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2007). See also Christian Schubert, ‘How to evaluate creative destruction: reconstructing 
Schumpeter’s approach’ (2013) 37 Cambridge Journal of Economics 227; D McCloskey, The 
bourgeois virtues: ethics in an age of commerce, (University of Chicago Press, 2006); D McCloskey, 
Bourgeois dignity: why economics can’t explain the modern world, (University of Chicago Press, 
2010). See also William Kingston, ‘Schumpeter and the end of Western Capitalism’, (2013) 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1; William Kingston, ‘Schumpeter, Business Cycles and Co-
evolution, (2006) 13 (1) Industry and Innovation 97; Charlotte Bruun, ‘The Economy as an Agent-
Based Whole – Simulating Schumpeterian Dynamics (2003) 10(4) Industry and Innovation 475; 
Anthony M Endres and Christine R Woods, ‘Schumpeter’s ‘conduct model of the dynamic 
entrepreneur’: scope and distinctiveness’ (2010) 20(4) Journal of Evolutionary Economics 583.  
42 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, above n41, 86. 
43 Markus C Becker, Thorbjorn Knudsen and Richard Swedberg, (eds), The Entrepreneur: Classic 
Texts by Joseph A Schumpeter (Stanford University Press, 2011).   
44 Paul J McNulty, ‘Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition’ (1968) 82(4) The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 639, 647, 654.   
45 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, above n41, 31.  
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‘the essential fact of capitalism’.46  Schumpeter observed capitalism as involving 
an evolutionary process driven by the impact of innovation or new 
competition.47 That process is characterised by disruption that may lead to 
qualitative change, industry mutation, potentially culminating in the forced exit 
of individuals or even entire industries incumbent in the market.48 This process 
is creative in the sense that the new firms are innovative and tend to be less 
shackled by existing industry constraints. For those that succeed, innovation or 
the innovative approach manifests as a market advantage capable of displacing 
incumbent firms constrained by their traditional approaches and technological 
restraints. For incumbents the mere prospect of this type of competition ‘acts not 
only when in being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat; it 
disciplines before it attacks’.49 Entrepreneurship and innovation thus drive new 
firms, which in turn drive economic growth by removing less competitive 
players from the market, and spur incumbents to innovate in order to become 
more competitive.50 Business failure is an inevitable part of this cycle, but it is 
accompanied by the entry of new firms, bringing new employment opportunities 
and new innovative practices and technologies.51 
Neo-Schumpeterian economic theory builds upon Schumpter’s work with a focus 
on the development of mature, robust economies and the role of government 
dealing with the ramifications of innovation.52  The Schumpeterian origins of 
neo-Schumpeterian theory include recognition of the role of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. However neo- Schumpeterian theory takes a very broad view 
of innovation, such that the neo- Schumpeterian concept of innovation is not 
confined to products or technology, but extends to ‘organisational, institutional 
and social innovation’.53 Thus, innovation, at its broadest sense, is the normative 
principle of neo-Schumpeterian economics. Business restructuring would fall 
within the notion of innovation. Neo-Schumpeterian theory suits a study of 
phoenix activity as it is primarily concerned with economic analysis of, and 
government responses to innovation and entrepreneurship. Neo-Schumpeterian 
economics supports the development of a social contract, implemented by 
government, to deal with ‘the peculiarities and imponderables of innovation 
processes’ in a manner that is both supportive of innovative processes and 
attendant to social responsibilities arising in the face of innovative success.54  
                                                        
46 Ibid, 83. 
47 Ibid, 82. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, above n41, 85. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Hanusch and Pyka, ‘Principles of neo-Schumpeterian economics’, above n 41, 15. 
53 Ibid, 276.  
54 Ibid, 15. 
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Phoenix activity, both legal and illegal, involves a sometimes elaborate scheme to 
continue trading in the same market at a competitive advantage over incumbent 
firms. The corporate form is abused to this end. To the extent that phoenix 
activity amounts to innovation of a business model allowing repeated, unfettered 
access to limited liability even in the face of repeated business failure, 
Schumpeter would see this as further proof that capitalism is ultimately 
doomed.55  
The paradox observed by Schumpeter is that capitalism is advanced by the 
creative destruction afforded by innovation and entrepreneurship, but that 
ultimately capitalism will be destroyed by its success rather than its failure.56  
While Schumpeter’s work focused upon the role of the bold, risk-taking, 
innovative entrepreneur, ultimately he saw entrepreneurship being necessarily 
replaced by a new mode of economic organisation. 57  This suggests that 
ultimately capitalism will be unable to tolerate entrepreneurship at its most 
rampant.  
If we value capitalist economic principles, then there is arguably a basis to reign-
in entrepreneurial activity that positions itself for an unfair competitive 
advantage. Phoenix activity pushes tolerance of entrepreneurship to its limits. 
Phoenix activity demonstrates the difficulties presented when legality is used as 
a measure of fairness of a competitive advantage. Ought the law respond to 
persistent entrepreneurial failure, such as that at work in cyclical phoenix 
activity, irrespective of whether the failures are honest, misguided, or 
uninformed failed entrepreneurial efforts? 
Honest business failure and restructuring are generally supported by financial 
and economic policy. Indeed a feature of most robust capitalist economies is a 
strong insolvency law regime that supports legal business failure. Incorporation 
and the choice of corporate form is a privilege afforded to enterprise.58 In 
accordance with this economic policy, the law must accommodate and tolerate 
legal phoenix activity, at least to some extent. The extent to which legal phoenix 
activity ought to be tolerated is directly linked to abuse of that tolerance. 
Intolerance might see persistent, yet legal, business failure construed as abuse of 
the privileges associated with the corporate form. This is most likely to be the 
case if the business failure is sufficiently frequent and has amassed significant 
economic wreckage at little personal cost to the controllers and shareholders of 
the failed entity. A more moderate approach would more closely align with 
economic theory supportive of innovation, tolerant of business failure and a 
                                                        
55 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, above n41, 133-134. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 2-3, 8-15.  
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highly developed capitalist economy. Such a moderate approach might involve 
setting a threshold tolerance limit of repeated business failure, even where that 
failure is honest. The tolerance threshold may trigger disqualification from 
completely unfettered access to limited liability in future endeavours. Capitalist 
economies are characteristically supportive of entrepreneurship but a mature 
and robust capitalist economy need not be supportive to the point of abuse of the 
privilege. One possible approach is for access to limit liability to be time barred. 
The time bar might give the business owners and entrepreneurs an opportunity 
to engage in education as to more appropriate business practices. 
 Given the prevalence of phoenix activity within MSMEs, rethinking dispute 
resolution mechanisms and the insolvency regime for these businesses may be 
valid approaches to continue to support legal business failure. This too might fit 
within a conceptualisation of business failure within a highly developed and 
functional capitalist economy.  
4. Conclusion 
It is implicit in capitalist economies that some individuals within the market 
stand to lose when a business fails. Vulnerable, unsecured creditors may be 
among those suffering losses. The critical consideration is that these losses occur 
within the broader economic framework in which long-term wealth creation 
throughout the economy may be ensured by supporting legal business failure. To 
focus intently on the losses of some unsecured creditors runs the risk of losing 
sight of the bigger economic picture. This is very difficult to do when the most 
vulnerable of all unsecured creditors are caught in the wake of phoenix activity 
albeit legal or illegal. 
Reforms raise concerns for their potential impact on corporate behaviour and 
the delicate equilibrium sought to be achieved in a capitalist economy between 
support for entrepreneurship targeting long term wealth creation, legitimate 
business failure and the loss incurred by those impacted by that business failure. 
The Productivity Commission has estimated that approximately 2000 business 
each year engage in phoenix activity.59 The more limited liability is misused, the 
stronger the argument to limit access to limited liability. 
This paper has proposed that economic theory can inform the law’s response to 
phoenix activity. Economic theory focussed upon entrepreneurship and 
innovation can to some extent explain why it may not be possible nor desirable 
to eliminate phoenix activity associated with business failure, since business 
failure is an inevitable part of the fabric of capitalist economies and phoenix 
activity is not always illegal. Even where phoenix activity is legal, abuse of legal 
business failure pushes economic policy supportive of a tolerant law to its limits. 
At this threshold point, it becomes more viable to limit the privileges associated 
                                                        
59 Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure, above n6, 28. 
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with limited liability and yet still accord with the broad principles supportive of 
normative business failure. Business failure in abuse of the privilege remains 
outside the norm. Arguably this accords with how ASIC is already using 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s206F – as a time out mechanism precluding access 
to control of a limited liability company, albeit for a relatively short time.  
 
